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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen ser på om mengden sykefravær blant lærere i Norge påvirkes av forhold på 
arbeidsplassen.  Funnene tyder på at det er en negativ sammeneheng mellom sykefravær og skolens 
ressursbruk. Økt arbeidsmenge og permanent jobbkontrakt er også forbundet med høyere sykefravær.  
Dersom man stratifiserer på lærernes alder, ser man at økt arbeidsmengede har en større negativ 
innvirkning på eldre lærere. For å ta hensyn til uobserverbar lærerhetererogentitet utnyttes 
intertemporal variasjon innen lærere som ikke har byttet skole. 
1 Introduction
Sickness absence is expensive for several reasons. The society must pay sickness
beneﬁts and replacement; the sick individuals themselves loose work experience
and acquired human capital; and having sick colleagues may be destructive for the
overall moral on the workplace. In the school sector, sickness absence may have an
additional cost. Teacher absence may be costly to the extent that the pupils learn
less during their absence (Miller, Murname and Willett, 2008; Clotfelter, Ladd and
Vigdor, 2009). Potential channels this may work through are: i) ordinary teachers
are substituted by less qualiﬁed replacement teachers; ii) the change of the teacher
itself may have a disruptive eﬀect on the student's learning environment; iii) in
the worse scenario classes may be canceled when a replacement teacher cannot be
found.
It is a common understanding in the literature that teacher quality is a crucial
input in explaining student outcome, but that observed measures of teacher quality
like education and experience turn out to explain very little of the variation in
student outcome (see Hanushek, 2002). It is therefore surprising that teacher absence
has not been devoted more space. There is a small empirical literature showing that
diﬀerent sick-leave policies and ﬁnancial incentives may be eﬀective devices to lower
teacher absence. These studies are based on US data (Winkler, 1980, Jacobsen,
1989 and Ehrenberg et al., 1991; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor, 2009).1
tThe optimal sick leave policy may be a combination of ﬁnancial incentives and
money spent on preventive systems. On the other hand, deriving this optimal strat-
egy is diﬃcult. Notwithstanding, in order to get closer to an eﬃcient policy device,
further knowledge of sources that inﬂuence absence are essential.
A couple of studies focus on diﬀerent factors that can explain variation in teach-
ers' sickness absence. The ﬁrst one is Leuven (2006), who investigates the eﬀects
on teacher absence of a Dutch policy that allows employees older than 52 to reduce
their working hours by 10 percent at the cost of a 3.5 percent reduction in salary.
The aim of this policy is to lower absence among older workers in the Netherlands
through subsidized work time reduction. Exploiting longitudinal micro data on all
teachers in primary and secondary education in the Netherlands, he ﬁnds that male
teachers lower their sickness absence in response to this policy. Bradley et al. (2007)
analyze so-called social multiplier eﬀects (Manski, 1993). More precisely they in-
vestigate whether absence has spillover eﬀects on other teachers' absence. Using a
database of matched teachers and schools obtained from the Queensland Govern-
1The literature on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentives on sickness absence in other sectors is more
elaborated. See for instance Johansson and Palme (2005) and references therein.
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ment of Australia they ﬁnd evidence that teachers' absence depends on the absence
of their co-workers.
Another interesting result in both Leuven (2006) and Bradley et al. (2007) is
that teachers on temporary employment contracts have lower absence rates than
teachers on permanent employment contracts (see also Ichino and Riphahn, 2005).
This suggest that less certain employment contracts may have a disciplinary eﬀect in
the sense that low sick rates improve the chances of renewed contract and permanent
position. These ﬁndings are in line with the so-called shirking theory, which says
that workers will shirk less and work harder when for instance the punishment is
hardened (Barmby et al., 1994; Shapiro, and Stiglitz, 1984).
Using longitudinal register data on teacher absence linked to school as well as
individual level teacher characteristics, the current paper's contribution to the lit-
erature is to analyze the eﬀect of working conditions on teacher sickness absence.
The conditions of teachers' work aﬀect the satisfaction they derive from their work,
and may be important predictions for the teachers' general well-being. For instance,
teachers facing high pupil-teacher ratios may have a more tiresome work day than
teachers facing lower pupil-teacher ratios. Similarly, teachers working in schools
with many disadvantage students may be more often confronted with stressful and
challenging situations. Teachers' workload and contract type are also considered
in the model because the literature has found these two variables to be important
determinants for teacher absence (Leuven, 2006; Bradley, 2007).2 The literature on
absence in other sectors have found working conditions to be important predictors
for absence (e.g. Hemningway et al., 1997; Brown et al., 1999; Ose, 2004).
To identify the eﬀects, I exploit intertemporal variation within teachers who
do not move to another schools. In addition to controlling for variation across
teachers, this strategy also rules out that the results are driven by teachers who
change schools. The results will be reported jointly and separately for male and
female teachers which is a common practice in the sickness absence literature. I also
stratify on the teacher's age.
The structure of the paper is as follows; section 2 describes the institutional
settings; section 3 presents the data; section 4 outlines the empirical approach; the
results are presented in section 5; I perform some robustness checks in section 6;
and ﬁnally section 7 concludes.
2Analyzing social multiplier eﬀects as in Bradley (2007) are more complicated and is therefore
not a part of this analysis.
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Table 1: Summary statistics: Teachers' sickness absence, measured in percent per
teacher per year
Mean s.d. N obs N teachers
All teachers 5.99 14.38 258,903 84,001
Female teachers 6.74 15.03 178,859 58,991
Male teachers 4.31 12.65 80,044 25,010
Teachers younger than 50 (young) 5.28 12.92 172,570 60,828
Teachers older than 50 (old) 7.39 16.84 86,333 12,196
Note: Reported is the amount of medical certiﬁcated sickness absence. The table
shows statistics for the whole population covering the school years 2000/2001 to
2004/2005.
2 Institutional settings
In the period under investigation, the Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund
(Statens Pensjonkasse) guaranteed teachers 100 percent (monetary) replacement
from the ﬁrst day of incapacity up to one year (sickness beneﬁt year). The ﬁrst
16 days of the absence period was paid by the employer, which for the teachers
is the municipality. The Norwegian National Insurance company (Folketrygden)
reimbursed the remaining days (maximum 248 working days) up to an upper limit
of 6G's.3 Average teacher salary in Norway is approximately close to this cap. Em-
ployees were allowed to use self-certiﬁcation for the ﬁrst three days of absence, but
needed a medical certiﬁcate for all absence exceeding three days.
After one year, the insured employee either goes back to work again or is trans-
ferred to the rehabilitation scheme. Rehabilitation is the step before disability, and
its intention is to avoid inﬂow into disability, either in forms of physical treatment or
vocational occupational rehabilitation. The maximum length of stay on the rehabil-
itation scheme is one year, and the monetary compensation payed by Folketrygden
is about 67 percent. Older employees may be transferred directly to the disability
scheme at the end of the sickness beneﬁt year as the probability is low that they
will resume work. This is common for employees beyond 60 years.
3 Data
Longitudinal register data on medical certiﬁcated sickness absence from Statistics
Norway, covering all teachers in Norwegian primary and lower secondary school from
2000/01 to 2004/05 (in total ﬁve school years) are linked to school characteristics
3In the period under investigation 1G increased from 48 377 NOK in 2000 to 58 139 NOK in
2004. 1 Euro '8 NOK.
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Figure 1: The relationship between teacher's age and sickness absence
from the Norwegian Ministry of Education as well as individual level teacher charac-
teristics also from Statistics Norway. Since a medical certiﬁcate is necessary only for
absence longer than three days, I do not have information on absence-spells shorter
than four days.
In the analysis I drop: Teachers who are continuously sick for more than one
year as they may not be representative for the average teacher teachers older than
67 as the national retirement age in Norway is 67; teachers on leave in order to avoid
mixing sickness absence with being on leave.4
Because of the rural settlement pattern in Norway, some very small schools exist.
These schools are neither representative and are therefore excluded in the analysis
(more precisely I exclude schools with less than 10 pupils). In total, I drop 2,452
teachers. The ﬁnal sample consists of 84,001 teachers and 258,903 observations
(since I observe the same teacher several times, the number of observations is larger
than the number of teachers.
3.1 Sickness absence
The yearly average amount of medical certiﬁcated sickness absence for the time
period under investigation is 6 percent, which can be seen in the ﬁrst row of Table
1. A general ﬁnding in the sickness absence literature is that females are more
sick than males, and that absence is increasing in age (e.g. Barmby et al., 2002).
Norwegian teachers are no exception. In Norway, average sickness absence among
4All female employees in Norway are entitled generous maternity leave. 3.6 percent of the female
teachers in our data that are not registered as being on leave have children younger than or equal
to 1 year. In order not to mix sickness absence with being on maternity leave, these teachers are
dropped.
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Figure 2: The distribution of average sickness absence per teacher per year, condi-
tional on that the teacher was absent (N = 105,322).
female teachers is about 2.5 percentage points higher than average sickness absence
among male teachers. And teachers born before 1950 (50 years old in 2000) are on
average 2.1 percentage points more absent than teachers born after 1950. Figure
1 illustrates the relationship between age and sickness absence separately for each
gender. For male teachers the relationship seems to be fairly linear until the age of
55, whereas female teachers between 30 and 35 years are more absent than female
teachers between 40 and 45 years. A likely explanation for the latter pattern is the
age of their own children. Sickness absence among both genders seem to increases
rapidly from about 55 years and onwards. Figure 2 shows the distribution of teacher
sickness absence conditional on that the teachers have been absent. According to
this ﬁgure, a majority of these teachers are absent less than 20 percent of the day's
work due to medical reported sickness absence. Moreover, average sickness absence
among teachers in this group is about 15 percent.
3.2 Working conditions
Two measures of the school's resource use are available; teachers hours per pupil
and teacher man-year per pupil (the number of working hours per week multi-
plied with the number of work weeks per year). Teacher hours measures how much
resources that are allocated to teachers' interaction with students, either in the class-
room or as extra education to speciﬁc students (more teacher hours is synonymous
with more resources). Teacher hours is regarded as a very precise measure of the
teacher resource use in schools. The relationship between teacher hours per pupil
and teacher man-year per pupil is strong. The correlation coeﬃcient is equal to 0.85
8
and is also illustrated in ﬁgure 1 in Falch et al. (2006). Both resource measures are
also strongly related to school size as further shown in Falch et al. (2006), thus it is
important to separately control for school size in the model. An alternative measure
of the school's resource use would be class size. However, the maximum class size
rule terminated the school year 2002/03. As a consequence, data on the number of
classes per grade stopped being collected.
To measure the student composition in the school, I include students with special
needs and minority students. These two variables are derived from calculating the
fraction of students within a school who are entitled to extra lessons or instructions
with education personnel and the fraction of students who are given extra lessons in
Norwegian. It is important to emphasize that conditional on schools' resource use
(which also capture extra resources used on special education to both Norwegian
students with special needs and minority students), minority and disadvantage stu-
dents are not confounded with extra money allocated to the school to compensate a
unfavorable student composition.The variables measuring the school's resource use
and student composition are both measured at the school level.
Teachers in Norway usually start their teaching career on a temporary employ-
ment contract. A permanent employment contract is obtained in subsequent year(s)
depending primarely on availability of vacant positions, but also teaching perfor-
mance. The latter contract type involves that the teacher is granted a job in the
school district. In accordance with previous ﬁndings (Bradley et al., 2007; Leuven,
2006; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) I expect absence to raise if a permanent employ-
ment contract is given to the teacher. Being on temporary employment contract is
assumed to have a disciplinary eﬀect because it is an element of uncertainty con-
nected to whether the contract is extended the next school year.
The number of a teacher's weekly working hours are regulated by the work
contract. However no strict guidance is imposed, involving that before the start
of each school year the teachers can negotiate their own working hours with the
principal to a certain degree. In line with the ﬁnding in Leuven (2006), decreased
number of working hours is predicted to lower absence. A reduced working week
involves more leisure time which can be used on other recreational activities that
may be health promotive.
3.3 Demographic and socio-economic variables
In addition to gender and age, it is a common practice in the absence literature to
control for education and income (e.g. Røed and Fevang, 2006; Askildsen et al.,
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2005; Leuven, 2006; Ose, 2004; Winkler, 1980).5 Askildsen et al. (2005) also control
for marital status and own children. They ﬁnd that absence is higher for separated
and divorced employees, whereas no strong signiﬁcant eﬀects relating to the number
of small children are found. The latter variable is meant to capture that small
children cannot stay home alone when they are sick. The fact that it is insigniﬁcant
may be due to that their absence data lack information on spells shorter than 14
days. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the family situation may be an important
determinant for absence and control for both marital status, the age of own children
(indicator variable that equals one if the teacher has own children younger than 12
years) as well as number of own children. Finally, to take into account that the
relationship between age and sickness absence is non linear, I choose to control for
a quartic age function which is assumed to capture all smooth variation.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables used in this
paper covering the whole period under investigation. The average Norwegian teacher
is 44 years old, has a workload of 90 percent and earns about 26 000 NOK per month.
She teaches in a school consisting of 284 pupils where 6 and 5 percent of the students
are minority or special need students. Average teacher hours per pupil and average
teacher man-year per pupil is 75 and 8.8. Furthermore, 70 percent of the teachers
are females, 65 percent have a permanent work contract, less than 5 percent do not
have suﬃcient education to be certiﬁed, 65 percent are married and have on average
1.9 children and 32 percent have own children younger than 12 years. 55 percent of
the Norwegian teachers work in pure primary schools (1-7 grade), 24 percent work in
pure lower secondary schools (8-10 grade), whereas the remaining 21 percent work
in combined schools (1-10 grade).
5Teachers salary is to a large extend centrally decided and equal across teachers who share the
same education and experience. Moreover, since it is a function of experience and education in a
nonlinear and interacting way its eﬀect is diﬃcult to interpret. From the school year 2001/02 some
local discretion in the teacher's wage bargaining were also introduced.
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Table 2: Summary statistics: Explanatory variables
Mean s.d.
working conditions
Minority students (measured in percent) 5.91 10.17
Students with special needs (measured in percent) 4.57 3.85
Man-year per pupil 8.78 2.60
Teacher hours per pupil 75.04 20.15
School size (number of pupils) 283.73 142.64
Primary school 0.55 0.51
Lower secondary school 0.24 0.43
Combined school 0.21 0.41
Workload (measured in percent) 90.14 18.79
Contract type
.-Permanent position 0.65 0.48
- Temporary position 0.15 0.36
- Missing information 0.20 0.40
individual control variables
Female 0.70 0.46
Male 0.30 0.46
Age (years) 44.80 11.04
Salary (NOK)/1000 25.96 3.61
Education
- Unlicensed (<= 12 years) 0.04 0.19
- Bachelor degree (12+3/4 years) 0.92 0.29
- Master or PhD degree (12+5/6 -9/10 years) 0.04 0.20
Marital status
- Unmarried 0.24 0.43
- Married 0.64 0.48
- Widow/widower 0.01 0.12
- Divorced/separated 0.10 0.30
- Missing information 0.01 0.04
Children
- Number of children children 1.86 1.19
- Child(ren) <= 12 year(s) 0.32 0.47
Note. Number of observations: 258,903; number of teachers: 84,001. All the variables are
reported Oct. 1st every school year by the principal or other school leaders.
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4 Empirical approach
Regarding sick leave, many aspects are of interest. The current paper focuses on
one of them; the amount of sickness absence and how it is aﬀected by observed
characteristics. This section outlines how to empirically estimate this.
Assume that the amount of sick leave of teacher i in school s and year t (aist) is
generated by the following equation:
aist = α + x
′
istγ + ηi + θs + δt + uist (1)
where x′ist is a vector consisting of all observable attributes of the teachers and schools
presented in table 2. Clearly, a large part of the sickness variation is explained by
the teacher's general health condition which is unobservable. Under the assumption
that the teacher's health state is constant over the period under investigation, it is
captured by the teacher ﬁxed eﬀect, ηi. A school ﬁxed eﬀect θs is included to control
for all other unobserved attributes with the schools that potentially is correlated with
the sick leave, δt are time indicator variables and uist is a random error term.
6
In principle, all types of ﬁxed eﬀects can be handled by including indicator
variables in the model. This is however a high dimensionality problem given the size
of our sample. One way to handle this is to exploit that with ﬁxed individual eﬀects
included, school speciﬁc eﬀects are solely identiﬁed by teachers moving between
diﬀerent schools during the sample period. This implies that possible biases caused
by teacher movements between schools can be avoided if a teacher who moves from
one school to another is treated as two diﬀerent individuals. Technically this involves
that each teacher-school combination is given a unique identiﬁer. In the empirical
implementation I will rely only on intertemporal variation within teacher-school
matches to identify the eﬀects of the observed characteristics of interest on absence.
This is equivalent to including a full set of individual and school eﬀects and the
interaction between these eﬀects (Falch and Strøm, 2005; see also Goux and Maurin,
1999). In addition to controlling for variation across teachers, this strategy also rules
out that the results are driven by teachers who change schools. The exact model I
estimate is give by equation (2).
aist = α + x
′
istγ + ηi · θs + δt + uist (2)
6The model in equation (1) is on reduced form since we do not know the accurate reason why
the teachers are absent. Any underlying structural model is therefore not formalized.
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5 Results
This section presents results from estimating diﬀerent variations of equation (2).
Because of the high correlation between the two variables that measure the school's
resource use, separate regressions are run for each of them, and only those which
include teacher hours per student are reported in full tables. The teacher man-year
coeﬃcients are reported in Table 5.7 In all tables, I only report the estimation results
for the working conditions, while the eﬀects of the individual control variables are
reported in appendix Table A1 and A2.
To shed some light on how the amount of sickness absence is related to observed
characteristics, I start out by presenting estimates based on a simple OLS regression.
The results are reported in column (1) of Table 3. Although it is diﬃcult to give
estimation results obtained from a cross sectional analysis causal interpretations, it
is of interest to compare these ﬁndings with the results obtained from the ﬁxed eﬀect
analysis (FE) where intertemporal variation within teachers who have not changed
schools are used to identify the eﬀects. The results obtained from the latter approach
are reported in column (2) of the same table.8
The OLS analysis produces a zero correlation between the school's resource use
and teacher absence, suggesting that the school's resource use have no impact on
absence. It is diﬃcult to explain why this occurs, but it is important to point out
that schools in Norway diﬀer substantially in terms of size, location, student body
and also teaching staﬀ. Larger schools in big urban cities are typically faced with
relatively few resources per pupil, whereas small schools situated in remote areas
have relatively more resources per pupil.9
When condition on ﬁxed eﬀects I ﬁnd evidence that increased use of resources
has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on sickness absence. More precisely, when ruling
out variation across teachers and schools I ﬁnd that sickness absence declines by
2 percent of a standard deviation if teacher hours per student increases by one
standard deviation. In terms of percentage points this eﬀect amounts to 0.3, and is
not negligible given that average sickness absence is 6 percent. The eﬀect of teacher
man-year per pupil is similar and reported in column 1 of Table 5.
The relationships between sickness absence and both variables that measure
7In a horse-race competition between teacher man-year per student and teacher hours per
student, the latter is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level (point estimate = 0.112), whereas the ﬁrst
one is clearly insigniﬁcant.
8Since many teachers have zero absence, the arguably most correct model would be a Tobit
speciﬁcation. However, teachers who are non-absent over the whole sample period will drop out
from the ﬁxed eﬀect approach.
9Winkler (1980) also ﬁnd zero eﬀect of the pupil-teacher ratio on absence
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Table 3: The eﬀect of working conditions on teacher sickness absence.
OLS FE
(1) (2)
Working conditions
Teacher hours per pupil −0.0021 −0.0139
(0.0024) (0.0056)∗∗
Minority students 0.0148 −0.0184
(0.0039)∗∗∗ (0.0126)
Special need students 0.0280 0.0247
(0.0108)∗∗∗ (0.0178)
Pupil 0.0027 0.0097
(0.0010)∗∗∗ (0.0058)∗
Pupil2/1000 −0.0032 −0.0155
(0.0014)∗∗ (0.0067)∗∗
School type (ref = Primary)
- Lower secondary −0.4241
(0.0906)∗∗∗
- Combined −0.0510
(0.0943)
Workload −0.0198 0.2102
(0.0022)∗∗∗ (0.0058)∗∗∗
Permanent position 0.9187 0.9458
(0.0921)∗∗∗ (0.1781)∗∗∗
N teachers 84,001 44,988
N observations 258,903 176,499
Note: The dependent variable is teacher i's sickness absence in year
t measured in percent. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity ro-
bust and corrected for individual level clustering. Year dummies;
dummy variables for missing information on the teacher's contract
type, length of education and marital status are included. *. ** and
*** denote signiﬁcance level at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively
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student composition are positive and highly signiﬁcant in the OLS analysis. The
point estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in minority and
special need students will increase the amount of sickness absence by 1 and 0.8
percent of a standard deviation respectively. Although the eﬀects are rather small,
they indicate that teachers working in schools that face a large share of minority
and special needs students have more sickness absence.10 The literature looking
at teacher quit behavior typically ﬁnd that teacher mobility is strongly related to
characteristics of the students (e.g. Hanushek et al. 2004). The true eﬀect of
student composition on sickness absence is then overestimated if teachers with good
health sort themselves to schools with few minority and special needs students.
With respect to minority students this seems to be conﬁrmed in column (2). It is
however somewhat puzzling that the eﬀect is negative and almost signiﬁcant at the
ten percent level. The point estimate of the special need students is on the other
hand fairly unchanged in the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation, but note that the standard
error has increased (t-value equals 1.4 in column 2).
Furthermore, absence is highest in schools with 313 pupils which is slightly larger
than average school size. Teachers working in pure lower secondary schools are less
absent than teachers working in schools with students at the primary level only.
The predicted positive eﬀect on absence of both workload and being on a per-
manent employment contract may be underestimated in an OLS analysis if teachers
with good health more often ask for a higher workload and are more easily given a
permanent position. Regarding workload this seem to be the case. The correlation
between workload and sickness absence is negative and signiﬁcant in the OLS analy-
sis, but obtains the expected signiﬁcant positive sign in the ﬁxed eﬀect analysis. The
latter implies that a ten percentage point increase in workload will increase sickness
absence by 2 percentage points. This corresponds to 14 percent of a standard devi-
ation. The point estimate of having a permanent position is similar in the OLS and
ﬁxed eﬀect analysis. Teachers on a permanent job contract are almost 1 percentage
point (about 7 percent of a standard deviation) more absent per year than teachers
who have a temporary position which is consistent with earlier evidence.
Although the ﬁxed eﬀect approach handles a large part of the potential selec-
tion bias, a small route for bias in the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates may remain. Biases
arise if workload and contract type are correlated with unobserved changes in the
teacher's health condition over time. However, since the most likely scenario is a pos-
itive correlation (higher workload and permanent employment contracts are given to
10Also Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2009) ﬁnd that absence rates are slightly higher in schoolw
with a high share of students that are eligible to free lunch.
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teachers with improved health), the potential unobserved time varying health eﬀect
will indeed bias the ﬁxed eﬀect estimates downwards, ceteris paribus.
The eﬀects of the remaining individual control variables that correspond to Table
3 are reported in appendix Table A1. As expected divorced teachers and teachers
with small children are more absent. Note also that married teachers seem to be
more absent than unmarried teachers. It is diﬃcult to interpret why the latter
result occurs, but it may be due to that being married is correlated with other
conditions that we do not control for in this model. Moreover, increased salary
seems to correlate negatively with absence (both in the OLS and FE speciﬁcation),
but as already emphasized this coeﬃcient may also capture omitted variables (see
footnote 6).11
5.1 Gender diﬀerences
Since female employees turn out to have higher sickness absence than male em-
ployees, a common practice in the absence literature is to separately look at at the
genders (e.g. Johansson and Palme, 2005; Leuven, 2006; Askildsen et al., 2005). I
follow this tradition and estimate equation 2 separately for female and male teachers.
Results obtained from ﬁxed eﬀect estimations are presented in the ﬁrst two
columns of Table 4. An increase in teacher hours per pupil has strongest eﬀect
on male teachers who reduce their sickness absence by 4.5 percent of a standard
deviation if teacher hours per pupil increases by one standard deviation. This may
indicate that only male teachers react on the school's resource use. However, female
teachers are more sensitive to an increase in teacher man-year per pupil as is shown
in column 2 of Table 5. If teacher man-year per pupil increases by one standard de-
viation, female teachers lower their absence by 1.2 percent of a standard deviation.
A general conclusion about resource use and gender diﬀerences is then diﬃcult to
derive. The point estimate of minority students is similar to the one in the pooled
sample, whereas only female teachers appear to increase their absence if the fraction
of special need students increases. Regarding changes in workload and the contract
type, the impact on both genders resembles the ﬁndings in Table 3 to a large extent.
Columns (1) and (2) in appendix Table A2 report the eﬀects of the remaining
individual control variables that correspond to column (1) and (2) of Table 4. Only
female teachers seem to respond to marital status and small children. The fact that
only married women have higher sickness absence is in accordance with Barmby et
al. (2002). Salary has still a negative eﬀect on absence and the size of the coeﬃcients
11With respect to the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation(s) in Appendix A, it is important to point out
that the results are driven by variation within very few teachers.
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Table 4: The eﬀect of working conditions on teacher sickness absence, ﬁxed eﬀect
estimates for diﬀerent sub groups
Female Male Young Old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Working conditions
Teacher hours per pupil −0.0087 −0.0277 −0.0104 −0.0171
(0.0066) (0.0103)∗∗∗ (0.0061)∗ (0.0109)
Minority students −0.0240 −0.0062 −0.0101 −0.0381
(0.0157) (0.0196) (0.0140) (0.0254)
Special need students 0.0339 0.0028 0.0137 0.0431
(0.0218) (0.0308) (0.0199) (0.0346)
Pupil 0.0103 0.0079 0.0060 0.0166
(0.0070) (0.0103) (0.0066) (0.0108)
Pupil2/1000 −0.0149 −0.0168 −0.0107 −0.0252
(0.0082)∗ (0.0118) (0.0078) (0.0125)∗∗
Workload 0.2153 0.1845 0.1499 0.3210
(0.0065)∗∗∗ (0.0129)∗∗∗ (0.0064)∗∗∗ (0.0112)∗∗∗
Permanent position 1.0197 0.7257 0.9677 1.1820
(0.2161)∗∗∗ (0.2950)∗∗ (0.1819)∗∗∗ (0.6459)∗
N teachers 33,075 11,913 29,855 15,133
N observations 127,983 48,516 112,672 63,827
Note: See table 3.
are similar to the ones in appendix Table A1.
5.2 Age diﬀerences
Another dimension for which diﬀerences in sickness absence are large is age. Al-
though sickness absence is increasing in age, the exact reason why this is observed
is still unknown. One explanation is that health is negatively aﬀected by exter-
nal factors such as working pressure, allowing health problems to arise over time.
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that health itself simply is a declining
function of time, implying that poorer health is inevitable when we become older.
Separating these two eﬀects are diﬃcult. However if only the latter explanation is
relevant, I expect no systematic diﬀerences to exist between young and old teachers
with respect to the eﬀect of observed characteristics. As an attempt to check this I
stratify on the teachers age and estimate equation 2 separately for old (born latest
1950) and young teachers (born after 1950).
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4. The
point estimates of teacher hours per student is larger for old teachers than for young
teachers. However, if interpreting the eﬀects in terms of percent of a standard devia-
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Table 5: The eﬀect of teacher man-year per pupil (TMYPP) on teacher sickness
absence, ﬁxed eﬀect estimates for all teachers and diﬀerent sub groups of teachers
Sub groups
All Female Male Young Old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TMYPP −0.0536 −0.0731 0.0161 −0.0322 −0.0954
(0.0271)∗∗ (0.0303)∗∗ (0.0620) (0.0283) (0.0626)
Note: The dependent variable is teacher i's sickness absence in year t measured in percent.
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and corrected for individual level clustering.
Each row represent one regression. Included control variables are the same as in corre-
sponding speciﬁcations in table 3 to 4.
tion, both eﬀects are close to 2 if teacher hours per pupil increases with one standard
deviation.12 Furthermore, both younger and older teachers increase their absence
by about 7 percent of a standard deviation if they are given a ﬁxed employment
contract.The fraction of special need students has still the expected positive sign for
both age-groups, but as emphasized earlier, this eﬀect is very small. The eﬀect of
minority students is unchanged compared to the ﬁndings in previous tables. Thus,
with respect to resource use, student composition and contract type the eﬀects are
similar to the corresponding ones in Table 3.13 Increased workload turns now out to
have larger impact on old teachers. The eﬀect amount to 19 percent of a standard
deviation if workload increases by 10 percentage points and is highly signiﬁcant.
This is a 35 percent increase compared to the eﬀect in the pooled sample in column
(2) of Table 3. The eﬀect for young teachers is 11.6 percent of a standard deviation
and is also signiﬁcant.
Summarized, older teachers appear to be more sensitive to changes in workload
than young teachers. This ﬁnding therefore supports that subsidized work time
reduction for older workers may be a good policy to lower sickness absence among
older workers (Leuven, 2006).
Regarding the eﬀects of the remaining control variables at the individual level
that correspond to the two last columns of Table 4, no big changes compared to
the overall ﬁndings are revealed. The only exception is that the dummy variable
for small children only aﬀects young teachers' absence (which is not surprising since
having small children is less frequent among older teachers). This is reported in the
two last columns of appendix Table A2.
12Once again, the eﬀects of teacher man-year per pupil is fairly similar.
13With respect to old teachers, it is important to point out that most of them have a ﬁxed
position.
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6 Robustness checks
A relevant question that arises when studying sickness absence is to what extent the
eﬀects are driven by the composition of the labor force (Askildsen et al., 2005; Araj
and Thoursie, 2005). In periods with excess demand for labor, marginal workers
will be employed to a larger degree, and these workers are expected to have higher
sickness rates on average due to poorer health. Similarly, the same type of workers
may also be the ﬁrst ones to leave when the labor market gets slacker again.
With respect to teachers, the teaching staﬀ is a function of the school size and
also the student composition. The demand for teachers automatically increases if
school size increases. Schools are in need for extra teachers if the student composition
worsen. It can neither be ruled out that teachers leave the school sector for a job in
other sectors, especially in periods when the labor market is tight. In order to check
whether our results are driven by variation in the composition of the teaching staﬀ
from year to year, I restrict the sample to teachers who are present in the whole
sample period (stable worker sample).14 The results are presented in Table 6. The
eﬀects of all variables are basically unchanged compared to the whole sample, but
note that the eﬀect of teacher hours becomes clearer. The only exception is being
on a permanent employment contract which has now a smaller eﬀect, although it
is still positive and mainly signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. This suggest that
teachers opting in and out of the education sector account for a large part of the
positive eﬀect of this variable derived in earlier tables.
7 Discussion and conclusion
In order to reduce the amount of sickness absence it is necessary to accumulate
knowledge about possible sources that explain variation in sickness absence.
Using longitudinal register data on teachers sickness absence linked to school
and individual characteristics, this paper studies the eﬀect of workplace character-
istics on the amount of medical reported sickness absence among teachers in public
primary and lower secondary school in Norway. The ﬁndings suggest that teachers
lower their amount of sickness absence when the school's resource use increases. I
also ﬁnd evidence that increased workload and having a permanent employment
contract are associated with higher absence. Moreover, old teachers appear to be
more sensitive to changes in workload than young teachers. All results are derived
from speciﬁcations where variation within teachers who have not changed schools is
14Average sickness absence for the stable worker sample is 4.76. This is 1.23 percentage points
lower compared to the whole sample. The standard deviation is 12.03.
20
used to identify the eﬀects.
To what extent we should be concerned about teacher absence depends on its
inﬂuence on students outcome. This is a question which so far has been (almost) ne-
glected in the literature and more research on his ﬁeld is therefore highly demanded.
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Table A1: Table 3 cont'd
OLS FE
(1) (2)
individual control variables
Male teacher −2.3459
(0.0734)∗∗∗
Age 6.4526
(0.7519)∗∗∗
Age2 −0.2098 0.4674
(0.0277)∗∗∗ (0.0838)∗∗∗
Age3 0.0029 −0.0091
(0.0004)∗∗∗ (0.0013)∗∗∗
Age4/1000 −0.0136 0.0622
(0.0026)∗∗∗ (0.0075)∗∗∗
Number of children −0.3394 −2.7057
(0.0450)∗∗∗ (0.2326)∗∗∗
Child(ren) < = 12 year(s) 0.7036 0.3210
(0.0954)∗∗∗ (0.2048)
Salary (NOK)/1000 −0.1433 −0.1697
(0.0155)∗∗∗ (0.0556)∗∗∗
Education (ref = Unqualiﬁed)
- Bachelor 0.1840 −0.2720
(0.1922) (0.8150)
- Master or PhD −0.0417 −2.8499
(0.2563) (1.3715)∗∗
Marital status (ref = Unmarried)
- Married 0.4067 2.4455
(0.1061)∗∗∗ (0.3669)∗∗∗
- Widow/widower 0.3032 −10.2182
(0.3577) (1.2490)∗∗∗
- Divorced/separated 2.6415 1.2082
(0.1604)∗∗∗ (0.5322)∗∗
Note: See table 3
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Table A2: Table 4 cont'd
Female Male Young Old
(2) (3) (4) (5)
individual control variables
Age2 0.3669 0.8791 −0.0083 −19.0954
(0.1003)∗∗∗ (0.1540)∗∗∗ (0.1829) (6.0842)∗∗∗
Age3 −0.0079 −0.0144 −0.0014 0.2103
(0.0016)∗∗∗ (0.0024)∗∗∗ (0.0032) (0.0709)∗∗∗
Age4/1000 0.0568 0.0874 0.0163 −0.8558
(0.0091)∗∗∗ (0.0137)∗∗∗ (0.0208) (0.3092)∗∗∗
Number of children −4.1323 0.0600 −2.9359 −3.7072
(0.3385)∗∗∗ (0.2564) (0.2357)∗∗∗ (1.5431)∗∗
Child(ren) < = 12 year(s) 0.6982 −0.3896 0.5080 0.3269
(0.2608)∗∗∗ (0.3160) (0.2186)∗∗ (0.6277)
Salary (NOK)/1000 −0.1609 −0.1969 −0.1847 −0.1894
(0.0692)∗∗ (0.0929)∗∗ (0.0592)∗∗∗ (0.1173)
Education (ref = Unqualiﬁed)
- Bachelor −0.6071 0.4665 0.0719 0.2517
(0.9485) (1.4571) (0.8327) (1.6077)
- Master or PhD −4.3810 0.3639 −2.4591 −2.1009
(1.6847)∗∗∗ (2.2811) (1.4247)∗ (3.3410)
Marital status (ref = Unmarried)
- Married 3.4397 0.4233 2.3442 5.5363
(0.4848)∗∗∗ (0.4864) (0.3692)∗∗∗ (2.5855)∗∗
- Widow/widower −9.8520 −8.7715 −11.5517 −6.7296
(1.4229)∗∗∗ (2.5753)∗∗∗ (2.6127)∗∗∗ (2.9027)∗∗
- Divorced/separated 1.5454 0.9771 1.1929 4.0576
(0.6612)∗∗ (0.8887) (0.5527)∗∗ (2.7598)
Note: see table 3.
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